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The future of terrorism

Dynamic scenarios

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1. About scenarios

In the early history of future studies a scenario was a “story” generating a possible future starting today and moving forward through a number of formative events. Due to uncertainties concerning events and the outcome of these it was often considered necessary to create several different scenarios. The scenarios were often used as backdrops against strategies for your organization (company, defence...) were analyzed. The scenarios were different for different organizations. Events having a major impact on an organization are very organization dependent.

For different reasons¹ the term scenario has been changing its meaning from the “story” to the end-state. Scenarios have developed to mean possible futures in which your organization can find itself. Futures described in terms relevant for your organization’s need for constructing strategies.

Based on plausible scenarios it is possible to estimate the capabilities required to meet the challenge posed by the scenario, and how best to use those capabilities, as well as identify possible shortcomings in current abilities. Capabilities could include specialist personnel, interoperable communication equipment, etc. The challenges could include inter-service or international cooperation to for example alleviate environmental or humanitarian disasters.

In the area of security scenarios are often used describing future possible attacks which you should defend yourself against. A terrorist attack could be described by:

- Characteristics of the actor (a terrorist organization or network)
- Goal of the terrorists
- Target (mass transport, official building...)
- Type of means used (explosives, CBRN...)
- A rough estimate of the impact (casualties, destroyed infrastructure, economic consequences...)

There are a number of problem/questions discussed concerning scenarios:

- The importance of spanning the whole space of possible futures (and how to know that you do).
- Should you or should you not try to assess probabilities of different scenarios.
- You can use computer models to test the internal consistency of the scenarios. Still scenario-generation is more of an art than a science.
- The scenarios can be used in a “soft” or “hard” way. In the “soft” way the main purpose of the scenarios is to demonstrate, in a pedagogic way, that there are several possible futures not only the trend-extrapolation one. In the “hard” way the scenarios are used as the basic information for building a strategy.

¹ Examples of reasons: Only the end-state was used, lower ambition in the scenario work, focus on the more distant future...



The types of scenarios just described have been used extensively, missing however is the dynamics of the courses of events and the successive interplay between different interacting factors. To gain further insights you could use dynamic scenarios as a complement to today's standard scenarios. This paper tries doing that applied to the area of terrorism, and in that way demonstrate the method in the form of examples.

2. About terrorism and countermeasures

There is no simple established definition of terrorism. There are however a number of recurring key-words observations in different definitions like²

- The goals of terrorism are political (in contrast to e.g. economic for organized crime)
- Many of the means used by terrorists are against the law. They are criminal activities and from that point of view the term “war-on-terrorism” is not quite adequate.
- Targets are not selected from those with an easily recognized coupling to the political goals. The immediate goal seems to be the creation of fear and an overreaction by the society.
- The terrorist organizations are nowadays networking and without clear boundaries (deed done in the spirit of...).

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon.³ Examples:

- Russian terrorism before WWI with the political goal to make Russia democratic
- Freedom movements in colonies after WWII.

Today's most urgent terrorism problem is the terrorism derived from Islamist fundamentalism. Even if this paper tries to more general it is of course heavily influenced by the type of terrorism we experience in the West as most problematic now.

Even if it is not the purpose of this article it would be worth while to brain-storm around possible new generations of terrorism.⁴ One obvious reason for this is the possibilities to take early preventive countermeasures.

The countermeasures against terrorism could be divided into two groups.⁵

- Countermeasures directed against today's manifest problems. This group of countermeasures can be described as directed against the symptoms. The countermeasures could cover the whole chain prevention – protection – crisis management – resilience. Important countermeasures actors are the intelligence community, police and military.

² Foghelin J.: Terrorism. Actors – Goals – Targets – Means. *The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences*. Proceedings and Journal. 1. 2006 pp 44-51.

³ Burleigh M.: *Blood & Rage. A Cultural History of Terrorism*. Harper Press. London UK. 2008.

⁴ Examples could be: anarchism (revival), environmentalism, feminism.

⁵ Allin D.H., Andréani G., Errera P. and Samore G.: Repairing the Damage. Possibilities and limits of transatlantic consensus. *ADELPHI PAPER* 389, IISS. Routledge. UK. 2007. pp 17-34 chapter one. Beyond the War on Terror.

- Countermeasures directed against the long term root causes of terrorism. The idea is to stop the emergence of or/and recruitment to terrorist groups. The countermeasures are mainly, changes of societal structures which could lead to terrorism.

The types of countermeasures in the two groups are very different. The politics are very different. The actors are very different. It is necessary to do things in the first groups. It is wise to include actions in the second groups among your countermeasures.

D. Byman has in an article presented a useful taxonomy of counterterrorism (against al-Qaeda)⁶. The following different strategies are described and analyzed (from the US perspective):

Strategy one: crushing al-Qaeda unilaterally.

Strategy two: crushing al-Qaeda multilaterally.

Strategy three: containment

Strategy four: defence.

Strategy five: diversion.

Strategy six: delegitimation.

Strategy seven: transforming terrorist breeding grounds.

For different reasons the author does not recommend strategies one, five and seven.

Two further observations concerning terrorists are:

- How to label terrorism and counterterrorism is of importance⁷. “War on Terrorism” could indicate an adversary of some status. The label also easily leads to military means at the primary countermeasure. These are not the best signals to send. It is better to talk about a criminal foe. Important countermeasures consist of international cooperation in the areas intelligence – sharing, police and judicial cooperation, and military action.
- Terrorism is by its very nature an asymmetric activity. If a society, the world order... cannot be changed by established processes (politics...) terrorism is the last resort. Possible asymmetric means used by non-state actors have been much discussed during the last decade. The responses to ruthless asymmetric means used by terrorists are of course problematic. There is a risk of convergence.⁸ Convergence in the sense that the defender also uses more ruthless means. Two ways of doing this:
 - Changing laws and regulations which strengthen counterterrorism.
 - The tacit use of unlawful means.

⁶ Byman D.: US Counter-terrorism Options: A Taxonomy. *Survival*. Vol. 49 no 3, Autumn 2007. pp 121-150.

⁷ Allin et.al. *op.cit.*

⁸ All types of convergence do not have to be problematic, see Vinci A.: Becoming the Enemy: Convergence in the American and Al Qaeda ways of Warfare. *The Journal of strategic Studies*. Vol 31, no 1, 69-88. February 2008.

3. Factors influencing on terrorism

Terrorism is a complex social activity. As often is the case with an adversary and a defender the dynamics is complicated. The terrorist organization seems to be flexible, adaptive and agile. The process of selecting countermeasures in democracies is seldom simple. Structuring the problem of the changes of terrorism a number of influencing factors will be treated. In all humbleness we must admit that each factor is complicated and that there are difficult relations between them.

3.1. The terrorists

Terrorism originates from a sense of frustration with (part of) the world order in combination with lack of other means than terrorist actions. The will to change into something better (goal, vision) is an important driving force. The selection of targets and means should be in harmony with the overarching goal of the activities. There are however other considerations which are important e.g.

- Terrorists are dependent on supporting groups (financing, for recruitment...). Targets and means ought to be selected so as to improve support.
- Endurance is of great importance for terrorism. It is important for the terrorists to avoid being detected by the intelligence, arrested etc. Taking precautionary measures can limit possible targets and means. If for instance the development and production of a mean requires a big organization it could be considered to be too easy to detect. Intelligence could be one way to deter the terrorists from using CBRN-means.⁹
- To be paid attention to is important for terrorists. Two ways could be used
 - sending your own messages through e.g. internet¹⁰
 - “manipulating” the mass media to serve your purposes.

To transmit a balanced threat assessment concerning terrorism to the public is a delicate task. There are several reasons for this:

- There are great uncertainties concerning the threat from terrorists.
- The perceptions of a given threat vary between different persons in the public.
- There are different opinions among politicians how to present threats.¹¹

⁹ Frank R.E. and Melese F.: Exploring the Structure of Terrorist’s WMD Decisions: A Game Theory Approach. *Defence & Security Analysis*. Vol. 20, no. 4, pp 355-372, December 2004.

¹⁰ Gowing N.: Real-time Crisis: New Real-time Information Tensions. Ch 25 in *Faster and more united? The debate about Europe’s crisis response capacity*. EU External Relations, European Commission External Relations Directorate General. December 2006.

¹¹ It is not a good idea to exaggerate the threat to get more resources for defence. To downplay the threat to calm the population is not good either. To a certain extent there seems to be in the European security discourse a shift towards high-probability – low impact incidents from low probability – high impact incidents. There are however good reasons to be prudent: “When risks have catastrophic worst-case scenarios, it makes sense to take special measures to eliminate those risks, even when existing information does not enable regulators to make a

3.2. The Society

Counter-terrorism measures cost. Costs could be derived from many different countermeasures:

- Intelligence organizations
- Protection and robustness of infrastructure
- Surveillance (CCTV etc.)
- Control (X-rays...) equipment + waiting time for customers.
- Countermeasures with repercussions on integrity (control of mail, phones etc.)

In a democracy there is on always ongoing process towards a balanced defence against terrorism. Balanced in volume, type etc. The “optimal situation” is changing over time. Incidents will change the balance. Citizens who feel very threatened could accept high costs and tough countermeasures.¹²

3.3 The technical development

Development of new technologies could facilitate countermeasures against terrorism (defensive means). New technologies could however also give the terrorists access to new more effective means (offensive). As in war there is a contest between measures and countermeasures. A very complicated contest since there are many types (very different) of measures and countermeasures. There are also several dimensions of possible impacts (casualties, economy, disturbances...).

Examples of defensive means:

- A more robust technical infrastructure (IT, energy...)
- A better defence against bio-agents by better detectors (real time detection and identification) and better vaccines and medications (faster to produce, multi-...)¹³
- Improved technical means in the intelligence area.

Examples of offensive means:

- New explosives (easier to produce and handle and with higher effect)
- New “cyber war” – concepts
- New methods to produce and spread bio-agents.¹⁴

reliable judgment about the probability that the worst-case scenarios will occur.” From: Sunstein C.R.: *Worst-Case Scenarios*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. 2007, p 119.

¹² Foghelin J.: Impacts of the New Societal Conflicts. Pp 41-66 in Axberg S. and Foghelin J. (Eds): *Perspectives on Military Technology*. The Royal Swedish Academy of war Sciences. Fälth & Hässler, Värnamo, Sweden 2006.

Loader I. & Walker N.: *Civilizing Security*. Cambridge University Press. UK. 2007.

¹³ Dando M.: The Impact of Scientific and Technological Change. Ch 4 pp 77-89 and Cordesman A.H.: When to Cry Wolf, What to Cry, and How to Cry It. Ch 7 pp 155-178 in Wenger A., Wollenman R. (Eds): *Bioterrorism. Confronting a Complex Threat*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Boulder London. UK. 2007.

¹⁴ Dando *op. cit.*

Technology forecasts combined with some sort of action-reaction gaming could be supportive to the analyses.¹⁵

3.4 The development of infrastructure

Urbanization, increasing use of IT-system for many purposes etc. make the modern society dependent on infrastructure. Infrastructure exemplified by (mass)-communications, energy supply and different IT-systems. Our citizens expect (in some cities maybe more demand) these infrastructure system to function well.

For good reasons the infrastructure has been identified by terrorists as weak spots in our societies. The infrastructure could be disturbed or worse by many means from conventional explosives to attacks through the cyber space. Without countermeasures infrastructural vulnerability could be increasingly problematic due to our increasing dependence on infrastructure.

At least for part of the infrastructure there could be technical solutions which make the infrastructure less vulnerable and robust. Most promising in this respect is probably the IT-area.

In many MSs parts of the infrastructure are successively privatized. At least during a transition period this can lead to a decreasing robustness.

Technology watch functionality could be relevant in this respect, monitoring the potential and maturity of current and possible future technical developments which may be used against the infrastructures, or could be used to protect them. It could also give advance warning of possible security issues that will appear as a consequence of widespread adoption of new technologies.

3.5 Impact of the Internet¹⁶

The Internet could be used both by the offensive side (the terrorists) and the defensive (our societies).

The Internet is already important for the terrorists in order to:

- Have online discussions and propaganda for ideological – strategic unification
- Recruit
- Spread knowledge about means.
- Serve as an important mean of communication.
- Spread information before, during and after an attack.

¹⁵ Work should be done concerning impacts of new technologies (and new use of old ones). Probably scenarios must be used. It should however be added that technology is not easily predictable. See Nye, D.E.: *Technology Matters. Questions to Live with*. The MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. USA. 2006. Ch 3.

¹⁶ Prins G. & Salisbury R.: Risk, Threat and Security. The case of the United Kingdom. *RUSI*. February 2008. Vol. 153, no 1 pp 6-11. p 8. Sageman M.: *Leaderless Jihad. Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia. USA. 2008, chapter SIX: Terrorism in the Age of the Internet pp 109-123. Stepanova E.: *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict. Ideological and Structural Aspects*. SIPRI Research Report No 23. OUP. UK. 2008, p 143. Tophoven R.: Das World Wide Web: Instrument des Dschihad. *ÖMZ* 2/2008, s 195-197.



The Internet could however also be used by the defender by:

- Spreading “counter-propaganda”.
- Using information on the Internet as a source for intelligence gathering.
- Giving information in crisis situations.

3.6 The society – mass media

Without being a postmodernist declaring that perceptions are more important than reality it is of course increasingly so that perceptions given by governments/agencies/journalists/terrorists are very important. It has been said that knowledge about mass media and internet in counterterrorism is as important as knowledge about the terrain in ground warfare.

Today (and still more so in the future) terrorists can transfer messages very rapidly e.g. in connection with a deed. There is an obvious problem for governments...to spread correct information rapidly on specific cases, and to counter disinformation. More general information could be given e.g. on websites but is of less interest. It could however be useful as a pointer to more situation specific information. This information should include advice about what to do in the situation. Just explaining how dangerous the situation is will only lead to fear and frustration. It requires a well-trained team and a good media-strategy to be able to counter the terrorists.¹⁷

3.7 Globalisation

al-Qaeda has used globalisation to its advantage.

It is probable that globalisation will continue on several fronts. If this is the case there will be new opportunities for terrorist to use for their purposes. Countermeasures are however possible. A parallel can be drawn to piracy through history. Now and then piracy has been advantageous to some states and it has created problems. In other times there have been agreements among states to fight against piracy which have had effect.

It is quite possible to reach agreements between concerned states agreeing on countermeasures in different areas (everything from non-proliferation to standard procedures for border control).

3.8 The society: security

The citizens of our Western societies seem to be more and more security seeking and risk averse. This is especially the case when risks are coming “from the outside”. Smoking, a traffic accident etc. even if many times more dangerous than terrorism seems to be a minor problem in comparison. The great public attention to terrorist deed (especially those with casualties) could help the terrorists.¹⁸

A “more relaxed” attitude can conversely make it more difficult for the terrorists. One of their goals is to create fear.

¹⁷ Richards A.: Terrorism and public information. Ch 14, pp 288-295 in Wilkinson P. (Ed): *Homeland Security in the UK Future preparedness for terrorist attack since 9/11*. Routledge. London and New York. 2007.

¹⁸ Gardner D.: *Risk*. Virgin Books Ltd. Ondon, UK. 1008. Rasmussen M.V.: *The Risk Society at War- Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge University Press. 2006.

3.9 The society: root causes

There are in our society's problems addressing root causes of terrorism.¹⁹ It could be seen as an excuse for terrorism. There are also political problems to do something concrete to abolish the root causes.

Sageman writes in his book²⁰ about root causes. Chapter Four contain an interesting analysis of integration of muslims in the USA and Europe. It gives a number of reason why the USA have been more successful the Europe. Chapter Eight presents ideas for combating gloval islamist terrorism.

- **Take the Glory out of Terrorism**
The most effective way to remove the glory from terrorism is to reduce the terrorists to common criminals. There is no glory in being taken to prison in handcuffs. No jihadi website carries such pictures, as opposed to the thousands of video clips of American military vehicles blowing up, as well as martyrs blowing themselves up in the vicinity of uniformed American personnel. Arrested terrorists will fade into oblivion and no longer inspire young people to join the fight against the West.²¹
- **Diminish the Sense of Moral Outrage**
Counterterrorism measures need to be seen as fair. People who have committed criminal acts should of course be arrested and prosecuted. The population understands that, and puts the blame on the criminals. It is when Muslims are indiscriminately singled out that they become angry. Any campaign against terrorism must be focused specifically on the perpetrators, and not on a more general segment of the population.²²
- **Counter the Enemy's Appeal**
European governments should begin a campaign to educate their population about the benefits of new immigrants. Once immigrants are accepted as full citizens of their countries, the friction between Muslims and non-Muslims sign up, the threat will persist. As the flow into the movement dries up, so will the danger. In essence, any threat requires some form of periodic susseses to inspire new young people to join the movement. As the successes vanish, so will the movement's appeal to the young, who will look elsewhere for inspiration.²³
- **Eliminate Discrimination Against Muslims**
European countries must provide their Muslim immigrant populations with equal opportunity in the labor market that refutes the claim that the West is at war with Islam. They must strive to eliminate any bias against Muslims and treat them on an equal footing with other members of their societies.²⁴
Any governmental singling out of the Muslim community will be viewed with suspicion in thes extremely tense times because of the global Islamist terrorist threat. Muslims resent being viewed as terrorists by the rest of the population and reject this

¹⁹ Allin et al, *op. cit.*

²⁰ Sageman M.: *op.cit.*

²¹ Sageman *op.cit* p 153..

²² Sageman *op.cit* p 155.

²³ Sageman *op.cit* p 163.

²⁴ Sageman *op.cit* p 163.


label. Even measures to protect some segments of the Muslim population will be viewed as discriminatory.²⁵

Even if there are difficulties taking root causes into concern is an important part of a countermeasure strategy.

4. Mutual influences


Between the factors treated in section 3 there are mutual influences. Instead of a diagram showing almost all factors connected to each other some selected examples with a limited number of factors are shown below.

Example 1. Selection of targets (infrastructure type) and means




²⁵ Sageman *op.Cit* p 165.

Example 2. Recruitment of terrorists



Example 3. Societal attitude to terrorism



5. Examples of dynamic-scenarios

5.1. A spiral of increasing terrorist violence

This scenario describes a vicious circle. The terrorists get positive feedback, from their supporters, from committing deeds with an increasing number of casualties. Even CBRN-means will be used. Mass media describes the horrors without any ideas of possible countermeasures. This worsens the situation. The countermeasures taken by our democratic societies are often a step behind the terrorists. The countermeasures undertaken are mainly reactive, i.e. aiming at avoiding earlier type of deeds. With a changing tactics from the terrorists this is not good enough.

5.2 Copycat

This scenario describes, like the previous 5.1., increasing violence from the terrorists. The increasing violence however is not accomplished by more casualties in each deed but by an increasing number of the same type of deed. Suicide bombers using simple explosive could be an example. This type of activities does not need any complex organisation. It is more a question of being inspired by others. Small independent groups are difficult to counter. In this scenario our societies have difficulties both to agree on short term countermeasures (expensive, “control” society...) and on measures to reduce root causes.

5.3 A spiral of decreasing terrorist violence

In this scenario the level of violence is decreasing (even if a zero-vision is not considered feasible). The reason for this is a successful double-track strategy using tough countermeasures (e.g. intelligence and infiltration) in combination with measures against root-causes. Even in the situation with decreasing violence it has been possible to keep resources for countermeasures on a high level. Endurance is important in order to be successful.

5.4. Terrorism as part of modus vivendi

In this scenario our citizens have de facto accepted terrorism on a low level as a part of life. Even if our societies are very sensitive in the security area a low level of terrorism is considered acceptable in relations to other dangers. Even if you try to take countermeasures against root causes it is almost impossible to avoid all frustration which in some cases can result in terrorism. What is considered important by the citizens in this scenario is to avoid all forms of catastrophic terrorism (e.g. NB). There is a high priority on all countermeasures against catastrophic terrorism.

5.5. An upward spiral of countermeasures

A number of serious terrorist attacks leads in this scenario to a sort of panic. The pressure on politicians to do something becomes high. The demands on countermeasures which will give near-term results are high. In spite of Draconian countermeasures there is no end of the terrorism. The combination of troublesome (in many dimensions) countermeasures and dangerous terrorism is a situation sought for by the terrorists. Ruthless countermeasures give



the terrorists ample opportunities for justified complaints. Martyrs could be created. There will be an emerging group of citizens who dislike the “Control Society”.

To break the upward spiral is not an easy task. The shift of paradigm to restraint and containment is difficult to make.

5.6. Technology race on the bio-area

Bio-technology is a dynamic field of research and development. The use of bio-agents for terrorism has up to now not been successful. The production (or theft) of suitable agents has been difficult. It is not easy to spread the agents efficiently. These are an on-going discussion if modern technologies will facilitate production and spread of bio-agents by terrorists. Looking at the problem from an attack-defence point of view you can also ask how modern bio-technologies can improve the defence side (rapid detection, new vaccines etc.). This scenario is about a type of arms-race in the bio-technology area. Important questions are how to reduce possible capacities on the terrorist side and how to improve defence systems.²⁶

5.7. New types of terrorism

Historically terrorism of certain type has disappeared after some decades. The terrorists have either reached their goals or have realized that they have failed. To be able to prevent new terrorists to emerge (new means and targets) there should be activities directed towards identification of pre-terrorism activities.

5.8. Ruptures

The examples above describe developments in a certain direction of great interest is of course for the defender to break a not-wanted development. On the terrorist side there is the opposite wish. Possibilities to create ruptures in the examples should be added.

²⁶ Wenger A., Wollenman, R. *op.cit.* Kellman B.: *Bioviolence. Preventing Biological Terror and Crime.* Cambridge University Press. USA. 2007 pp 47-54 and Ch 6. Rees M: *Our Final Hour. A Scientist's Warning: How Terror, Error, and Environmental Disaster Threaten Humankind's Future in This Century – on Earth and Beyond.* Basic Books. New York. USA 2003. Chapter 4.

6. Typology of threats

The following typology is a condensation from Foghelin,²⁷ Dietl et al.²⁸ and Wilkinson.²⁹

6.1 Actors

- Ethno nationalist groups (e.g. ETA, PLO, PKK, LTTE [Tamil Tigers])
- Ideological/social revolutionary groups (e.g. RAF, Brigade Rosse)
- Religion – political groups (e.g. HAMAS, al-Qaeda)
- State terrorism groups
- Single issue groups (e.g. animal rights extremists)

A second classification of actors refers to organisation:

- Network of networks (e.g. al-Qaeda)
- More traditional groups which could be linked to a network
- “Freelance terrorists” who may be inspired by e.g. al-Qaeda but without a direct link to the network.

A third classification of actors refers to mainly national organisations (mainly active in one state) or international organisations.

6.2 Goals

The terrorist actors are normally related to one overarching goal e.g.:

- Ethno-nationalist goal
- Social-revolutionary goal
- Religion-political goal
- Anti-colonial goal
- Democratic goal

6.3 Targets

Targets could be people and/or infrastructure in a broad meaning (communication networks..... buildings).

Examples:

- Communications (trains, aeroplanes, buses, underground...)
- Essential services (power grid, water supplies...)
- Public spaces (sport arenas, theatres...)
- Political and military places (EU central functions, parliaments, military bases...)

²⁷ Foghelin *op.cit.*

²⁸ Dietl W., Hirschmann K., Tophoven R.: *Das Terrorismus-Lexikon. Täter, Opfer, Hintergründe.* Eichborn. Frankfurt am Main 2006.

²⁹ Wilkinson P. (Ed.): *Homeland Security in the UK. Future preparedness for terrorist attack since 9/11.* Routledge. London and New York. 2007. Part I and II.

6.4 Means

Different effects could be:

- Kill or injure people
- Psychological effects
- Disturbance of infrastructure
- Disruption of IT-system
- The economy.

Means to accomplish effects could be:

- Conventional means (small arms, explosives...)
- CBRN-means
- Cyber terrorism
- A separation could be made between conventional attacks and suicide bombers.

6.5 A functional typology of terrorism³⁰

This typology is based on two criteria: (a) the level and scale of a group's ultimate goals and agenda (i.e. whether global or more localized); and (b) the extent to which terrorist activities are related to or are part of a broader armed confrontation and are combined with other forms of armed violence.

1. *The 'classic' terrorism of peacetime.* Examples of this include communist and other leftist terrorism in Western Europe in the 1970s and the 1980; right-wing terrorism when it is not a tactic used by loyalist and other anti-insurgency groups in armed conflict; and ecological or other special interest terrorism.

2. *Conflict-related terrorism.* Such terrorism is systematically employed as a tactic in asymmetrical local or regional armed conflicts (e.g. by Chechen, Kashmiri, Palestinian, Tamil and other militants). Conflict-related terrorism is tied to the concrete agenda of a particular armed conflict and terrorists identify themselves with a particular political cause (or causes) – the incompatibility over which the conflict is fought.

3. *Superterrorism.* While the other two types of terrorism are more traditional, superterrorism is a relatively new phenomenon (also known as mega-terrorism, macro-terrorism or global terrorism). Superterrorism is by definition global or at least seeks global outreach and, as such, does not have to be tied to any particular local or national context or armed conflict. Superterrorism ultimately pursues existential, non-negotiable, global and in this sense unlimited goals – such as that of challenging and changing the entire world order, as in the case of al-Qaeda and the broader, post-al-Qaeda transnational violent Islamist movement.

6.6 Clustering

There are no easily identifiable couplings between actors – goals – targets – means. A try has however been made on a specific limited database to cluster.³¹ The following clusters emerged:

³⁰ Stepanova *op.cit* pp 9-11

³¹ Chenoweth E. and Lowham E.: On Classifying Terrorism: A Potential Contribution of Cluster Analysis for Academics and Policy-makers. *Defence & Security Analysis*. Vol. 23, No 4, pp. 345-357, December 2007.



- Bombings of a public public population where a liberation group takes responsibility.
- Bombings of a public population at a commercial target where groups take responsibility.
- Bombings of a public population at a commercial target by unknown groups.
- Bombings of official populations at official targets by unknown groups.
- Bombings of foreign populations at military targets where a group takes responsibility.
- Gun attacks where a righteous vengeance group takes responsibility.
- Assassination of foreign populations with guns by unknown groups.
- Attacks on foreign, official populations in open air targets where groups take responsibility.
- Attacks on official populations at official targets with no deaths where a group takes responsibility.
- Kidnappings at open-air targets with small casualties, no deaths.

7. Concluding points

7.1 Internationalisation

There are still terrorist groups which are mainly active within one state. The trend seems however to be internationalisation of activities. Countermeasures against international activities must be international. A common threat perception and common ideas about possible (technical) countermeasures are essential.

7.2 A dynamic threat

The terrorists, at least part of them, seem to be agile and adaptive. For this reason it is important to be able to counter yesterday's threats as well as tomorrows. A three part strategy is necessary:

- Countermeasures against the repetition of attacks which have already taken place.
- Countermeasures of a more generic type i.e. they provide countermeasures against several threats. An example could be a good crisis management capability.
- Countermeasures against a clever selection of low – probability – high – consequences – cases.
- An agile (reacting on early warnings etc.) defence against threats towards which no countermeasures have been prepared (for economic reason you cannot prepare for all possible threats even if it would be possible to foresee them).
- Develop tools to simulate the dynamic relationship between “offence/defence” as the “modern terrorist” will want to anticipate the defensive “societal” response and will try to include it in its advanced planning of attacks.

7.3 The right balance between protections of national security and protection of civil liberties

This is a “catch 22” problem. If there are terrorist attacks more countermeasures should have been taken, even if they had intruded on civil liberties. If there have not been any attacks for some time it could depend on the countermeasures or on a decline of terrorism. “Humanity doesn't learn very much from events *that do not happen*”.³²

7.4 Intelligence³³

The most important preventive actions against terrorism are intelligence. More international terrorism implies more shared intelligence. To share intelligence is a difficult action of trust,

³² Delpuch T.: *Savage Century. Back to Barbarism*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington D.C. 2007. p 167.

³³ About prevention see: Sirseloudi M.P.: How to Predict the Unpredictable: on the Early Detection of Terrorist Campaigns. *Defence & Security Analysis*. Vol. 21, No. 4, pp 369-386, December 2005. For some general interesting points of view concerning intelligence see Betts R.K.: *Enemies of Intelligence. Knowledge & Power in American National Security*. Columbia University Press. New York. USA. 2007. Fägersten B.: Mer underrättelsesamarbete med nytt EU-fördrag? (in Swedish. More cooperation in intelligence with the new EU-constitution). IS. Internationella Studier Nr. 1, våren 2008, s. 10-17.



but it is necessary. Infiltration is an important part of intelligence. It is a difficult task even with groups belonging to the same culture. With other groups it will take a long time. Intelligence tools useful for finding out about terrorists are not the same as those for finding out about military units of an opposing state. Modern technologies could be used in both cases but they are different. Human intelligence is more prominent in the counter-terrorism area. Agents for human intelligence in the counter-terrorism area are not limited to the intelligence communities. Policemen, security personnel, bank clerks, etc. could give valuable information of interest for counterterrorism. It is however important that rules are established and there are limits for the ambitions otherwise we will end up in a new GDR with STASI-agents.

7.5 Modern means

Terrorists have been successful using modern technologies for communication, spreading of messages etc. They work in networks.

The terrorists have not however been successful using CBRN-means, even if some efforts have been made. It may come however.

Non-proliferation in a broad sense is important to make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire CBRN-means. This is especially difficult and important in the bio-area.³⁴

³⁴ Kellman *op Cit.* Ch 8.