The costs of relying on non-European defence suppliers
Europe today is over-dependent on defence equipment sourced abroad. This undermines its own defence industry and creates significant military, technological, strategic, and political vulnerabilities for European countries. In a world marked by geopolitical realignment, military confrontation, economic disruption, and technological competition, such vulnerabilities pose an acute risk to Europe’s security.
While the EU can incentivise Member States to procure more together and more European, defence procurement decisions remain the prerogative of national governments. National decision-makers should therefore seriously consider the true costs and consequences of defence procurement from abroad and shift investment predominantly into Europe’s own defence industry. Such "European preference" in defence procurement is not just an economic objective, but a strategic imperative for enhancing Europe’s defence and deterrence capacity.
Trends in European military purchases: a rise in non-European suppliers
Ever since the end of World War II, the biggest part of European defence acquisition budgets has been spent on non-European systems and equipment. After the end of the Cold War, this trend continued (albeit to varying degrees among European countries) against a background of drastically reduced defence budgets.
In the two years following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine the predominance of non-European suppliers in Europe reached a new peak. Between February 2022 and mid-2023, acquisitions from outside Europe accounted for 75% of new orders publicly announced in the EU. While this figure has since decreased somewhat, Europe today remains overdependent on defence procurement from abroad.
Proportion of European defence spending on non-EU imports
- 60 %
2007-16
- 75 %
February 2022 (start of Russia’s war against Ukraine) until mid-2023
Most defence procurement decisions have important ramifications: militarily, technologically, strategically, and politically. Consequently, the predominance of non-European suppliers on European defence markets bears far-reaching implications for Europe’s security.
In its European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) of March 2024, the EU therefore calls for reversing the current procurement trend. It even sets specific targets, whereby by 2030 at least 50% of defence procurement budgets should be spent within the EU, and 60% by 2035.
However, defence procurement decisions are an exclusive prerogative of national governments. The EU can provide incentives to cooperate and buy more European, but ultimately it is for Member States to decide what to buy and from whom. The key to reversing the persistent dominance of non-European suppliers in Europe lies in capitals.
To avoid critical dependencies and safeguard Europe's security in a rapidly changing and increasingly dangerous world, national policy- and decisionmakers should carefully evaluate the short- and long-term consequences of their procurement decisions and the total cost of buying non-European. Only by investing in its own defence industry can Europe guarantee its security and enhance its freedom of action in the long term.
Main factors in why European countries buy defence equipment from abroad
Several long-term structural factors and short-term situational circumstances contribute to this imbalance in European defence procurement.
Why buying military equipment abroad endangers Europe’s defence industry
Preference for non-European products has a series of interrelated negative effects on Europe’s defence industry.
How purchasing defence equipment abroad risks Europe’s security
The predominance of non-European defence purchases also has ramifications for the security of European countries.
The cost of non-Europe in defence procurement
Read ASD's note on the cost of non-European suppliers in European defence markets. Published by ASD in September 2024, updated in April 2025.